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Abstract
Adversarial training has proven to be effective in hardening networks against adver-
sarial examples. However, the gained robustness is limited by network capacity and
number of training samples. Consequently, to build more robust models, it is common
practice to train on widened networks with more parameters. To boost robustness,
we propose a conditional normalization module to adapt networks when conditioned
on input samples. Our adaptive networks, once adversarially trained, can outperform
their non-adaptive counterparts on both clean validation accuracy and robustness. Our
method is objective agnostic and consistently improves both the conventional adversarial
training objective and the TRADES objective. Our adaptive networks also outperform
larger widened non-adaptive architectures that have 1.5 times more parameters. We
further introduce several practical “tricks” in adversarial training to improve robustness
and empirically verify their efficiency.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved impressive performance on many machine learning
tasks, which has led to growing interests in deploying these models in practical applications.
However, recent studies have revealed that models trained on benign examples are susceptible
to adversarial examples, examples crafted by an adversary to control model behavior at test
time [4, 32, 12]. The adversarial perturbation overlaid on top of the benign examples is often
small enough to be imperceptible to humans, yet can cause the model to misclassify the
image.
The existence of adversarial examples has raised security concerns for many high-stakes
real-world applications such as street sign detection for autonomous vehicles. While initial
works stated that digital adversarial examples built for sign-detection may not be a real
threat since the camera can view the objects from different distances and angles [22], more
recent attacks were proposed for making stronger adversarial examples that are invariant
to various transformations by optimizing over the expected value of a set of pre-defined
transformations [2]. In fact, this security concern has turned into an actual threat after a
recent study showed that adversarial stickers are able to fool real-world self-driving cars [13].
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These security concerns and threats have guided researchers to create models that are both
accurate in prediction and robust to attacks.
Various methods have been proposed for defending against adversarial examples. One
popular approach is to detect and reject adversarial examples [23, 25, 40], which can be
ineffective when the adversary is aware of the detection method in order to adapt accordingly
[5]. Another approach is to introduce regularization for training robust models [7, 18], but the
increase in robustness from such methods is limited. [3] showed that many proposed defenses
give a false sense of security by obfuscating gradients, as meaningful gradient information
is necessary for optimization based attacks. [3] broke these defenses by attacks that build
good approximations for the gradients. Among various defense methods, adversarial training
[24, 19, 39, 29] is one of the most common methods for training robust models. In adversarial
training, a robust model is trained on adversarial examples that are generated on-the-fly,
which is effective but also makes adversarial training expensive.
Robust models have some interesting properties that have been revealed in recent studies.
First, it is argued that there exists trade-offs between accuracy and robustness [34, 43, 31]. It
is difficult to make a model robust to all samples while maintaining the same level of accuracy.
Second, it is difficult to adversarially train robust models that generalize since adversarially
robust generalization requires more data [28] and models with more capacity [24]. Training
high capacity models on large datasets increases the cost of adversarially training robust
models. Third, while adversarial training is expensive, it is shown that adversarially trained
models learn feature representations that align well with human perception [34]. These
feature embeddings can produce clean inter-class interpolations similar to generative models
in Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [11]. These properties have inspired us to explore
model capacity and sample efficiency.
Recently, conditional normalization, built upon instance normalization [35] or batch
normalization [17], has been successful in generative models [20] and style transfer [16].
Conditional normalization can be seen as an adaptive network that shifts the statistics of a
layer’s activations by applying network parameters conditioned on the latent factors such as
style and classes [9, 10]. Inspired by these studies, we propose to exploit adaptive networks
for robustness in the adversarial training framework.
Contributions
We propose building hardened networks by adversarially training adaptive networks. To
build adaptive networks, we introduce a normalization module conditioned on inputs which
allows the network to “adapt” itself for different samples. The conditional normalization
module includes a meta-convolutional network that changes the scale and bias parameter
for normalization based on input samples. Conditional normalization is a powerful module
that enlarges the representative capacity of networks. Our adversarially trained adaptive
nets can be potentially more robust than conventional non-adaptive nets as they can adapt
the network to be robust to adversarial attacks on a specific sample instead of all samples.
Furthermore, adaptive normalization adds far fewer parameters than other methods for
increasing expressiveness and robustness (e.g. wide resnets).
Our experiments on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 benchmarks empirically show that our
proposed adaptive networks are better than their non-adaptive counterparts. The adaptive
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networks even outperform larger networks with more parameters in terms of both (clean)
validation accuracy and robustness. Moreover, we have made several key observations that
not only help our understanding but also significantly boost the performance of adversarial
training. Such “tricks” like larger step-size and initializing with a natural model can be widely
used in adversarial training, and help us build stronger baselines for non-adaptive networks.
Our adaptive network outperforms previous reported results by about 4%, and the strong
baselines we achieved by about 1% in robust accuracy.
The proposed adaptive network can be combined with various other methods to improve
the robustness against adversarial examples. Besides extensive experiments with our improved
fast adversarial training, we show adaptive networks can be combined with the stronger
TRADES [43] objective formulation that is very effective for the CIFAR benchmark, which
suggests that our method is objective agnostic and can be helpful in improving many of the
well-established baselines. Finally, we introduce a variant of single-step adversarial training,
when combined with adaptive network, can approach the robust accuracy of non-adaptive
network with multi-step adversarial training. Though our single-step variant performs
slightly worse than our improved fast adversarial training, it complements recent interests in
accelerating adversarial training and showcases why conventional single-step methods did not
result in robustness against iterative attacks.
2 Related work
Here we provide a brief overview of robustness and normalization layers which are closely
related to our proposed adaptive networks. We also provide an overview of adversarial
training, which plays a critical role in our method,
Robustness, in the white-box threat model, is commonly measured by computing the
accuracy of the model on adversarial examples constructed by gradient-based optimization
methods starting from validation samples. This evaluation method provides an upper-bound
on robustness as there is no theoretical guarantee (at least for all classes of problems) that
adversarial examples crafted using first-order gradient information are optimal. From a
theoretical point of view, finding optimal adversarial examples is difficult. Some recent works
have proposed finding the optimal solution by modeling neural networks as Mixed Integer
Programs (MIPs) and solving those MIPs using commercial solvers [33]. However, finding
the optimal solution of an MIP is generally NP-hard. Although recent advancements have
been made in their formulations by enforcing some properties on the network [38], finding
the optimal solution is only feasible for small networks and is very time consuming. That is
why certified methods in practice provide lower-bounds on the size of perturbations needed
for causing misclassification by solving a relaxed version of the problem.
[27] propose certified defences by including a differentiable certificate as a regularizer.
Many studies follow this line of work and propose certified defenses [36, 37, 8]. While from a
theoretical point of view certified defenses are interesting, in practice, adversarial training is
still the most popular method for hardening networks – leaders of various computer vision
defense competitions and benchmarks utilize adversarial training in their approach [39, 43, 24].
Adversarial training, in its general form, corresponds to training on the following loss
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function,
min
θ
∑
i
κJ(fθ(xi), yi) + (1− κ)J(fθ(xi + δi), yi) (1)
where J is a differentiable surrogate loss used for training the neural network such as the
cross-entropy loss, (xi, yi) is the ith data-point and its correct label, fθ is the network with
trainable parameters θ, κ is a hyper-parameter that controls how much weight should be
given to training on natural examples, and δi corresponds to the adversarial perturbation for
the ith sample. To keep the perturbation unrecognizable to humans, the norm of δi is often
bounded. Throughout this paper, we will use the common `∞-norm bound on δ. Note that
our adversarial training loss merges information from both natural and adversarial examples.
Early adversarial example generation methods required many iterations since their goal
was to help an attacker build an adversarial example using minimal perturbations [32, 26, 6].
However, from a defender’s perspective, the goal is to train on fast and bounded adversarial
examples. With speed in mind, [12] proposed training on a single-step `∞ attack called
the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM computes ∇xJ(x, y, θ) and sets δ =  ·
sign(∇xJ(x, y, θ)), where  is the perturbation bound. Later, it was shown that stronger
attacks such as BIM [21], completely break FGSM adversarially trained models. The
BIM attack can be seen as an iterative version of FGSM where during each iteration, the
perturbation is updated using an FGSM-type step but with a step-size s which is usually
smaller than ,
δk = δk−1 + s · sign(∇δJ(fθ(x+ δk−1), y)) (2)
where δk is the perturbation at iteration k of the BIM attack. After every iteration of the
BIM attack (equation (2)), δk is clipped such that δk ∈ [−, ].
Adversarial training started blooming when [24] proposed training on adversarial examples
generated using the PGD attack, which is a variant of BIM with a random initialization and
projection back on the `p-norm ball. Through experiments, they showed that the PGD attack
is the strongest first-order adversary, which was later verified by [3]. Consequently, almost
all of the successful adversarially trained robust models use the PGD algorithm to generate
adversarial examples.
Training on adversarial examples generated using PGD increases the cost of training
by a factor of K, where K is the number of iterations of the PGD attack (i.e., number of
times we update δ using equation (2)). While we will use PGD-K attacks for evaluating
the robustness of all our models, due to the high computation cost associated with PGD
adversarial training, we perform most of our adversarial training by modifying a recently
proposed algorithm for speeding up adversarial training [30]. A recent study [1] suggested
a well tuned single-step adversarial training can defend against strong PGD adversarial
examples. However, the method in [1] heavily depends on domain specific cyclic learning rate
schedule, using a step-size s which is greater than , and early stopping based on frequent
examination. Also, they only justify their results empirically without providing intuition on
why this rather unconventional setup (s > ) is needed.
Normalization layers such as batch normalization [17] and instance normalization [35] have
become important modules in modern neural networks. Normalization layers standardize
input to have zero mean and unit variance, and then shift these statistics using scaling and
bias parameters. [42] suggest scaling and bias parameters can be even more important than
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Figure 1: Network architecture with adaptive layers.
standardization. Conditional normalization, where scaling and bias are adaptively determined
by latent factors, has shown to be powerful in many computer vision tasks including style
transfer [16, 10] and generative adversarial networks [20].
3 Adaptive Networks
We introduce adaptive networks with conditional normalization modules in this section. Our
motivation for adding conditional normalization modules is two-fold. First, by introducing
adaptive layers conditioned on inputs, we can “adapt” a trained network to be more robust
to an individual input sample without requiring any information about its class label – a
useful trait for robustness evaluation.
Second, conditional normalization can increase the expressiveness and effective capacity of
the network, which has been shown to have a positive effect in improving model robustness.
Adversarially trained models with more expressive capacities are more robust than their less
expressive alternatives [24, 30]. At a high level, these conditional normalization modules
can be considered as adding multi-branch structures to a network which is known to be
effective in improving accuracy on validation examples [15]. As we will see in the experiments,
our normalization module indeed does improve the clean validation accuracy and is more
effective1 than simply widening or concatenating features in practice.
Below, we show how to create an adaptive network by adding conditional normalization
modules to the wide residual network (WRN) [41] architecture.
3.1 Network architecture
Let x ∈ RN×C×H×W represent the feature maps of a convolutional layer for a minibatch of
samples, where N is the batch size, C is the width of the layer (number of channels), and
H and W are the feature map’s height and width. If xnchw denotes the element at height
1The adversarially trained adaptive nets have higher validation accuracy and robustness compared to
networks with more trainable parameters.
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h, width w of the cth channel from the nth sample, the conditional normalization module
transforms the feature maps as,
Norm(xnchw|z) = ν(z)nc xnchw + µ(z)nc, (3)
where ν(z), µ(z) ∈ RN×C are scale and bias parameters of the normalization module. The
network with conditional normalization becomes adaptive to the latent factor z as ν(z), µ(z)
are outputs of convolutional networks with trainable parameters. Equation (3) represents
normalization in a general form: when latent factor z is a style image and x is normalized by
its mean and variance, equation (3) becomes adaptive instance normalization for image style
transfer [16]; when latent factor z is latent code like random noise, equation (3) becomes the
building module for the generator in StyleGAN [20]. We provide details on how we use input
sample as latent factor z as below.
In our experiments, we add our conditional normalization module to wide residual
networks (WRNs) [41] to create adaptive networks for classification. WRNs are a derivative
of ResNets [14], and are one of the state-of-the-art architectures used for image classification.
A WRN is a stack of residual blocks (fig. 1 (a)). To specify WRNs, we follow [41] and denote
the architecture as WRN-β-α, where β represents the depth and α represents the widening
factor of the network.
The WRN architecture for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets we use in this paper
consists of a stack of three groups of residual blocks. There is a downsampling layer between
two groups, and the number of channels (width of a convolutional layer) is doubled after
downsampling. In the three groups, the width of the convolutional layers are {16α, 32α, 64α},
respectively. Each group contains βr residual blocks, and each residual block contains two
3× 3 convolutional layers equipped with ReLU activation and batch normalization. There is
a 3× 3 convolutional layer with 16 channels before the three groups of residual blocks. And
there is a global average pooling, a fully-connected layer and a softmax layer after the three
groups. The depth of the WRN is β = 6βr + 4.
We add conditional normalization for the first residual block of each of the three groups.
The normalization module is applied between the two convolutional layers in a block, as
shown in fig. 1 (b). The inputs to the conditional normalization module are the feature maps
produced by the first convolutional layer. Our conditional normalization module consists
of a three layer convolutional network: two 3 × 3 convolutional layers with 16α, and one
1 × 1 convolutional layer to match the dimension of the three different residual blocks,
2× {16α, 32α, 64α}, respectively. We use average pooling as the last layer to get ν(z), µ(z)
for equation (3). Our adaptive network is only slightly larger than the original WRN, and
becomes more robust when adversarially trained, as shown in section 5.
4 Adversarial training
We briefly review the adversarial training algorithm we will use to make our adaptive networks
robust, and discuss the “tricks” we found useful in improving these algorithms. We then
introduce a variant of single-step adversarial training that can couple with standard natural
training without extra tuning, and shed light on why this single-step method works and why
the conventional single-step methods fail to become robust against PGD attacks. Finally,
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we discuss an alternative objective function for adversarial training as adaptive networks
can complement other active research directions in improving the practical robustness of
networks.
PGD adversarial training. Well-known robust networks on MNIST and CIFAR-10 were
adversarially trained by [24] by setting κ = 0 in equation (1) and only training on adversarial
examples. Training just on adversarial examples is justified from a robust optimization
framework, and modeled as a two-player constant sum game between the adversary, which is
in charge of the perturbation δ, and the classifier with network parameters θ. Formally, we
consider adversarial training based on the following minimax formulation,
min
θ
max
δi
∑
i
J(fθ(xi + δi), yi) s.t. ‖δi‖∞ ≤  ∀i (4)
[24] solved the optimization problem in equation (4) in an alternating fashion. Before each
minimization step on the network parameters θ, they compute δ using a PGD-K attack on the
fly. Every perturbation update step of the PGD-K attack (equation (2)) requires computing
∇δJ(fθj(xj + δk−1j ), yj), where δk−1j are the adversarial perturbations of the jth mini-batch
after the previous k − 1 times δ update step, and θj represents network parameters at the jth
minimization iteration. To compute ∇δJ(fθ(xi+ δk−1i ), yi), required for every step of PGD-K,
we need a complete forward and backward pass on the network. As a result, every iteration
of PGD adversarial training is (K + 1) times more expensive than an iteration of natural
training. A typical value used for K is 7 to train a robust model for CIFAR-10 benchmark
[24].
Fast adversarial training. To speed up training of robust models, we adopt a fast
adversarial training algorithm recently proposed by [30]. [30] showed that they can achieve
comparable robustness to PGD adversarial training [24] on the datasets of our interest
(CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100) with roughly the same cost as standard (non-robust) training.
The fast algorithm (Free-m) has a perturbation parameter δb of shape N × C ×H ×W
which is updated once during every minimization iteration. To accelerate robust training,
Free-m applies simultaneous updates for the network parameters θ and perturbation δ, which
makes its computation cost almost the same as natural training. In the jth minimization
iteration, both ∇δJ and ∇θJ are computed for the current mini-batch (xj, yj) and network
parameters θj,
∇θJ = E{(xj ,yj)}[∇θ J(fθj(xj + δjb), yj)]
∇δJ = ∇δ J(fθj(xj + δjb), yj)]
Then θ and δ are updated as,
θj+1 = θj − τ∇θJ
δj+1b = clip(δ
j
b + s · sign(∇xJ),−, ).
In Free-m, each mini-batch is replayed m times. For example, if m = 2, we move on to the
next mini-batch every other step, and therefore the data for the first two iterations would be
the same (i.e., (x1, y1) = (x2, y2)). Since we train on the same mini-batch m-times in a row,
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the hyper-parameter m is more-or-less analogous to the number of iterations of the PGD
training algorithm K. We use the same number of minibatch updates for Free-m adversarial
training and natural training on clean images, i.e., we train Free-m for 1/m number of epochs
in total. Free-m can achieve similar robustness accuracy as PGD-K adversarially trained
models. In our modification, we apply two “tricks” which we found to be particularly effective
when combined with free adversarial training: initializing with the natural trained model and
applying larger step-size for updating perturbations. We built stronger baselines with such
techniques, which can be even further boosted with our adaptive networks.
(a) Classical RFGSM (b) Proposed RFGSM
Figure 2: Loss surface plots for points surrounding the first two CIFAR-10 validation images
for models adversarially trained on (a) classical RFGSM and (b) proposed RFGSM. The
proposed method generates smoother surface, even for a misclassified example (No. 1).
Single-step adversarial training. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [12] is one of
the most popular single step method for generating adversarial examples. With a random
initialization of perturbation, Random FGSM (RFGSM) is similar to doing a one step of the
PGD algorithm. [24] showed robust model adversarially trained with FGSM and RFGSM
have almost zero robust accuracy under PGD attacks. A more recent preprint [1] suggested
RFGSM-based training can be used to defend PGD attacks when combined with cyclic
learning rates and early stopping by examining the robust accuracy on the validation dataset.
The RFGSM method in [1] provides an alternative way to train robust models besides PGD
adversarial training [24] and fast adversarial training [30] on benchmark datasets such as
CIFARs. However, it may encounter difficulty to generalize to problems without special
learning rate schedules and problems where we cannot perform online validation for early
stopping.
We introduce a variant of RFGSM that works well even with a normal training schedule.
We make two key modifications to the classical RFGSM. First, instead of initializing from
uniform random value between − and , we initialize from a normal distribution with zero
mean and σ2 variance. We find σ to be rather insensitive between  and 3, and always use
2 in experiments. Second, we do not clip the perturbation after the FGSM update. Note
that the perturbation is still bounded to some extent as the stepsize of FGSM is . In the
proposed variant, the initialized noise can be viewed as boosting training samples instead of
the FGSM update.
The classical RFGSM may fail because adversarial examples generated by FGSM during
training are likely to fall on the boundary of the  bounded `p ball. After training on those
adversarial examples, the loss surface becomes smooth at the boundary but the cross-entropy
loss may take on large values within the  − `p ball which can be exploited by multi-step
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methods like PGD. As shown in fig. 2, the proposed RFGSM makes the loss surface smoother
and hence harder to attack. Even for a difficult sample (validation example id 1), where there
are adversarial examples for models trained by both the classical RFGSM and the proposed
RFGSM, the loss surface of our proposed RFGSM is smoother.
TRADES objective. The proposed adaptive network is complementary to the choice of
objective in adversarial training. Besides the minimax problem in equation (4), we can also
train adaptive networks with the TRADES objective proposed in [43]. TRADES achieves
impressive robust accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset by combining supervised training and
virtual adversarial training as,
min
θ
max
δi
∑
i
J(fθ(xi), yi) +
1
λ
J(fθ(xi + δi), fθ(xi))
s.t. ‖δi‖∞ ≤  ∀i,
(5)
where λ controls the trade-off between robustness and natural accuracy. We follow [43] for
training algorithms and parameter settings in our experiments.
Table 1: Performance of (robust) CIFAR-10 models. We inject adaptive layers in WRN-28-4,
and compare with WRN-28-4 and WRN-28-5 with more parameters. We provide stronger
baselines with our adversarial training “tricks” in row 5-7.
Row # (Robust) model Evaluated Against #Parameter(million)Natural PGD-20 PGD-100
1 Natural 94.10% 0.00% 0.00% 5.85
2 PGD-7 [24] 83.84% 40.03% 39.38% 5.85
3 Free-10 [30] 81.04% 40.56% 40.03% 5.85
4 Free-10-adaptive 85.00% 43.16% 42.68% 6.05
5 Free-10-lstep 77.75% 45.10% 44.77% 5.85
6 Free-10-WRN-28-5 77.81% 45.99% 45.77% 9.13
7 Free-10-init 80.60% 46.88% 46.67% 5.85
8 Free-10-adaptive 80.99% 48.09% 47.87% 6.05
5 Experiments
In this section, we train robust models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. In all the experiments,
we train WRNs without dropout for 120 epochs and with minibatch size 256. We start with
learning rate 0.1 and decrease the learning rate by a factor of 10 at epochs 60 and 90. We
use weight decay 1e-4 and momentum 0.9. For evaluating the robustness of the models, we
attack them with PGD-K attacks. For the PGD attacks, we use s = 2 and  = 8, and vary
the number of attack iterations K.
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5.1 Quantitative evaluation and ablation study
We summarize our quantitative evaluation on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 in table 1 - 5.
In table 1 - 4, unless otherwise explicitly specified through the name of the model, the
architecture used for producing these results is WRN-28-4. We report validation accuracy on
natural images and adversarial images generated using PGD attacks with K = 20 iterations
and K = 100 iterations. We also compare our method with adversarially trained robust
models following [24] and [30]. Note that the PGD-7 adversarially trained model [24] requires
≈ 7× more training time than natural training on clean images, while the Free-10 models
[30] have similar computation cost as natural training. Models with the suffix “small” are
adversarially trained using a step-size of s = 2. The adversarially trained models without
the small suffix are trained with a step-size s = 6.
Table 2: Performance of (robust) CIFAR-100 models. Adaptive networks with our adversarial
training “tricks” in row 8 has 7% robust accuracy improvement over PGD-7 [24] in row 2.
Row # (Robust) model Evaluated Against #Parameter(million)Natural PGD-20 PGD-100
1 Natural 74.84% 0.00% 0.00% 5.87
2 PGD-7 [24] 57.18% 18.38% 18.13% 5.87
3 Free-10 [30] 54.18% 19.21% 18.98% 5.87
4 Free-10-adaptive 61.19% 21.95% 21.68% 6.07
5 Free-10-lstep 50.52% 23.08% 23.02% 5.87
6 Free-10-WRN-28-5 51.02% 23.12% 23.03% 9.16
7 Free-10-init 55.93% 24.86% 24.61% 5.87
8 Free-10-adaptive 57.26% 25.86% 25.69% 6.07
Advantage of adaptive network. We first evaluate robust models trained with step-
size s = 2 for perturbation updates following [24] (rows 2-4 in tables 1 and 2). We
can train a robust WRN-28-4 with PGD-7 [24] that achieves about 40% accuracy under
strong PGD attacks. Our alternative adversarial training mechanism, Free-10 [30] achieves
slightly better robust accuracy under PGD attacks with a drop in natural accuracy on
clean validation images. Since Free-10 is significantly faster than PGD adversarial training,
we also use it to adversarially train our adaptive networks. Our adaptive network with
conditional normalization built on WRN-28-4 (Free-10-adaptive, row 4) outperforms the
PGD adversarially trained WRN-28-4 (PGD-7, row 2) and Free-10 (row 3) in both natural
accuracy and robust accuracy, illustrating the advantage of our adaptive networks.
Strong baseline and effectiveness of our “tricks” in adversarial training. We explore
“tricks” to improve the performance of adversarial training. As shown in tables 1 and 2, by
comparing Free-10 (row 3) and Free-10-lstep (row 5), we can see that the larger step-size
used for training does improve the robustness of free training but again at an additional cost
of decreasing natural validation accuracy.
Note that our Free-10-adaptive model has slightly more parameters compared to the
adversarially trained PGD-7 and Free-10 models. For this reason, we compare to higher
capacity models to ensure that the superiority of our adaptive network is not solely due to
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Table 3: Performance of (robust) CIFAR-10 WRN-28-4 models with TRADES training [43].
(Robust) model Evaluated AgainstNatural PGD-20 PGD-100
Natural 94.90% 0.00% 0.00%
Non-adaptive 84.44% 53.74% 53.18%
Adaptive 84.79 % 54.98% 54.76 %
having a (slightly) larger number of parameters. To create strong, high-capacity baselines we
adversarially train a larger model WRN-28-5 (row 6), and WRN-28-4 with a naturally trained
model as initialization (row 7). Our adaptive network is slightly larger than the non-adaptive
WRN-28-4, and is much smaller than WRN-28-5. A good initialization surprisingly helps
both natural accuracy and robust accuracy. Our adaptive network outperforms the best
strong baseline for both natural accuracy and robust accuracy.
Table 4: Performance of (robust) CIFAR-10 WRN-28-4 models with RFGSM training.
(Robust) model Evaluated AgainstNatural PGD-20 PGD-100
Natural 94.10% 0.00% 0.00%
PGD-7 83.84% 40.03% 39.38%
RFGSM 85.81% 0.11% 0.00%
Our RFGSM 84.03 % 38.71% 37.99 %
Adaptive 84.87% 39.95% 38.92%
TRADES objective and higher robustness. In table 3, we combine the proposed
method with the TRADES objective [43] since our adaptive network is complementary to
the objective design of adversarial training. We can achieve better robust accuracy on the
CIFAR-10 dataset with the TRADES objective, and our adaptive network performs better
than the non-adaptive network. Note that the TRADES method applies PGD-10 to generate
adversarial examples in adversarial training, which is slower than PGD-7 in [24], and much
slower than the fast algorithm we used.
RFGSM and the proposed variant. We present experimental results on RFGSM ad-
versarial training in table 4. We halved the number of epochs for training so that RFGSM
training can complete in similar time as natural training and free adversarial training. Clas-
sical RFGSM with uniform sampling and norm clipping cannot provide robustness against
strong PGD attacks. The proposed RFGSM variant can defend against PGD attack, and
achieves comparable robust accuracy as PGD adversarial training when combined with our
adaptive network. Though our RFGSM results are worse than our best robust accuracy in
table 1 when we use fast adversarial training with “tricks” to train the adaptive network,
the proposed variant works well with standard training of ResNet on CIFAR , which is
complementary to the recent interest in replacing PGD with RFGSM training.
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Table 5: Performance of (robust) CIFAR-10 WRN-34-10 models. We directly compare with
previously reported results in [24, 30] and our strong baselines.
(Robust) model Evaluated Against #Param(million)Natural PGD-20 PGD-100
Natural 94.76% 0.00% 0.00% 46.16
PGD-7 [24] 87.3% 45.8% 45.3% 45.90
Free-8 [30] 85.96% 46.82% 46.19% 45.90
Free-10 79.45% 48.03% 47.9 % 46.16
Free-10-init 84.03% 50.23% 49.93% 46.16
Free-10-adaptive 84.39% 50.93% 50.68% 47.28
5.2 Larger network and previous benchmark
In table 5, we report results on a larger network WRN-34-10, which is widely used for the
CIFAR-10 benchmark. We first directly compare with the accuracy values reported in the
literature in [24] and [30] by training on the objective equation (4). Our adaptive network
achieves better robust accuracy with more than 3% improvement. Moreover, our adaptive
network outperforms the strong baselines we achieved with “tricks” (Free-10 and Free-10-init)
on both natural accuracy and robust accuracy.
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(c) PGD-3 validation accuracy.
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(f) PGD-3 validation accuracy.
Figure 3: Training curves for robust models for (top) CIFAR-10 and (bottom) CIFAR-100:
(left) accuracy on adversarial training samples; (middle) accuracy on clean validation samples;
(right) accuracy on PGD-3 validation samples.
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Figure 4: Visualization of adversarial examples generated for natural and robust WRN-34-10
for CIFAR-10 with large  = 30 following [34]. The large  adversarial examples generated
for robust models align well with human perception.
5.3 Training curves and qualitative analysis
We plot the training and validation accuracy of the Free-10, Free-10-adaptive, and PGD-7
adversarially trained (PGD-7) models after each epoch in fig. 3. Training accuracy of robust
models is computed using adversarial examples that are seen during training, and do not
correspond to the natural training accuracy. They can be thought of as robustness on
training examples. In figs. 3a and 3d, the PGD-7 model fits the adversarial examples built
for the training samples to a rather high accuracy, while Free-10 seems to never overfit to
the training-set adversarial training samples. The training accuracy of Free-10 [30] is quite
close to the final adversarial validation accuracy in figs. 3c and 3f. The natural validation
accuracy of PGD-7 increases faster than Free-10 at the beginning, while the accuracy at
the end of training become close, as shown in figs. 3b and 3e. Free-10 consistently improves
robust accuracy against adversarial validation samples, while PGD-7 seems to saturate after
the fast increase at the beginning (see figs. 3c and 3f). Our adaptive network (blue curve)
always has higher natural and robust validation accuracy than the non-adaptive WRN-28-4
models except for a short range around epoch 60 in figs. 3b and 3c, where the accuracy of the
adaptive network decreases. Tuning the learning rate could potentially prevent this decrease
and further boost the performance of adaptive networks.
[34] presented an interesting side effect of robust models: largely perturbed adversarial
examples for adversarially robust models align with human perception. That is, they “look”
like the class which they are getting misclassified to. We use PGD-50 to generate adversarial
images with large perturbations ( = 30). The generated images for our adversarially trained
adaptive nets have characteristics that align well with human perception (Fig. 4).
6 Conclusion
Inspired by recent research in conditional normalization [16, 20] and properties of robustness
[24, 34, 28], we introduced an adaptive normalization module conditioned on inputs for
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boosting the robustness of networks. Our adaptive networks combined with a fast adversarial
training algorithm, can effectively train robust models that outperform their non-adaptive
parallels and also non-adaptive networks with more parameters. Our study on adversarial
training presents several “tricks” that can be widely used to improve the training performance
of robust models. We also introduce a variant of singe-step adversarial training that can
achieve competitive robustness against multi-step attacks. We verify the effectiveness and
efficiency of adaptive networks and our adversarial training with experiments on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 benchmark and WRN networks.
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